Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

The State of Utah v. Channan S. Singh : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Appellee.
Charles F. Loyd Jr.; Ronald S. Fujino; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Singh, No. 900497 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2911

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIEF

KrU
60
.A10

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

br>nk<gpR.htfw TTmaw ^OOW

7 (7)

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No.

900497-CA

v.
CHANNAN S. SINGH,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR FORGERY, FIVE
COUNTS, ALL SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501
(1990), WITH ONE COUNT ENHANCED PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-1001 AND 1002 (1990)
(HABITUAL CRIMINAL) IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4077)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

CHARLES F. LOYD, JR.
RONALD S. FUJINO
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED

Attorney for Appellant

MAR221991
.'UUliy'TrNooBiin
Clerk-of the Court
-mahCoOrt-of-'APPaate

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

*

CHANNAN S. SINGH,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.

900497-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR FORGERY, FIVE
COUNTS, ALL SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-501
(1990), WITH ONE COUNT ENHANCED PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-8-1001 AND 1002 (1990)
(HABITUAL CRIMINAL) IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, PRESIDING.

R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4077)
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1022
Attorneys for Appellee

CHARLES F. LOYD, JR.
RONALD S. FUJINO
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW....

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

THE UTAH FORGERY STATUTE, BROADLY AND
REASONABLY CONSTRUED, EMBRACES DEFENDANT'S
TRANSFER OF PARTIALLY COMPLETED PERMITS,
BASED ON THE INTENT AND POLICY OF THE MODEL
PENAL CODE ON WHICH THE STATUTE IS BASED

8

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS ON ANY OF HIS ALTERNATIVE
THEORIES BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO
PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR ACQUITTING
DEFENDANT OF FORGERY

18

POINT III DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED FOR FORGERY
WHICH PROSCRIBED DIFFERENT CONDUCT THAN
PROHIBITED USE OF A LICENSE STATUTE AND
WHICH WAS MORE SPECIFIC TO DEFENDANT'S
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
POINT IV
CONCLUSION

JUDGMENT FOR ATTEMPTED FORGERY MAY BE ENTERED
IF EVIDENCE OF FORGERY IS FOUND NSUFFICIENT

21
22
24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Page
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)
Carpet B a m v. State of Utah, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990)
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 (Utah),
cert, denied., 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990)

18
2
2

Clay v. State, 57 Ala. App. 630, 330 So. 2d 453 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1975)

9

Hall v. State, 31 Ala. App. 455, 18 So. 2d 572 (Ala.
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 245 Ala. 455, 18 So. 2d
(Ala. 1944)

9

Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333 (Utah 1979)

21,22

Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989)...

1

State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

20

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983)

18,19
20,22

State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985)

23

State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

8

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983)

19,22

State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d 717 (Utah 1985)

23

State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987)

12

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

2

State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161 (1980)

22

State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982)

8

State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984)

18

State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa 1988)

9

State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1989)

12,13

State v. Pitts, 726 P.2d 113 (Utah 1986)

19

State v. Shondel# 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969)...

21,22

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah, 1988)

19

State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980)

20

Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981)

20

CONSTITUTIONAL, PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14.72 (West 1986)

10

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 638.1

11

N.M. Stat. Ann. S 30-16-10 (Repl. Pamp 1984)

10

Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133 1990)

21

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1990)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990)

12

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1990)

22

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990)

12

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990)

1/2,910,11,
16,17,
20

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-518 (1990)

12

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990)

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1002 (1990)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1990)

1

OTHER AUTHORITIES
4 C.E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 510 (14th ed.
1981)

9

4 C.E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 512 (14th ed.
1981)

9

L.D. Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, Pt. 5 at
190 (1st ed. 1973)

11

Model Penal Code § 224.1 (Official Draft and
Explanatory Notes 1985)

11/12,
17

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No. 900497-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CHANNAN S. SINGH,

*

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, five
counts, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-501 (1990), with one count enhanced pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1001 and 1002 (1990) (habitual criminal), in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Must a "writing" be complete before it constitutes

a forgery under the Utah forgery statute?

Because the issue

presents a question of law, it is reviewed for its correctness.
Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).
2.

Did the trial court improperly refuse to instruct

the jury on defendant's theories of the case?

An appeal

challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents a
question of law.

Carpet Barn v. State of Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775

(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The trial court's legal conclusion is not

accorded any particular deference and is reviewed for its
correctness.

City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513,

516 (Utah), cert, denied.. Ill S.Ct. 120 (1990).
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion to dismiss the forgery charge on the ground that the
forgery statute was more applicable to the case than the
prohibited use of a license statute, urged by defendant?

Because

the issue presents a question of law, the trial court's legal
conclusion is afforded no deference and is reviewed under a
"correction of error" standard.

State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326,

327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Channan S. Singh, was charged by information
with 5 counts of forgery, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(1990) and one count for being a habitual criminal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990) (R. 1-5). At the preliminary
hearing, defendant made a motion to dismiss the charges on the
ground that permits sold by defendant were facially incomplete
and thus incapable of facilitating a fraud pursuant to section
76-6-501 (R. 3, 22-26).

Defendant also alleged at the preliminary hearing that
the motor vehicle code, Utah Code Ann., Title 41, governed the
alteration of driver's licenses. The Third Circuit Court denied
the motion and defendant was bound over to the Third Judicial
District Court (R. 3). In that court defendant made a motion to
quash the bindover order on the same grounds previously alleged,
and the court denied the motion (R. 21-26).

One week before

trial and immediately before and after trial defendant renewed
his motion to dismiss the information, again on the same grounds
previously alleged, and again the trial court denied the motion
(R. 31-34; Transcript of Proceedings of July 10, 1990, hereafter
"T." 2-19 and 81-85).

Following trial the court rejected

defendant's proposed jury instruction over defendant's exceptions
(R. 110-118).

Defendant was convicted on all counts at trial and

sentenced to a term of not less than seven years on all counts
(R. 132-36).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 27, 1989, West Valley City detective Holly
Wright, assigned to the Metro Sting Operation, went to 4014
Benview Drive to buy a driver's license from an unnamed
individual.

That individual was not there, but defendant was,

and he sold two Driver License Temporary Counter Permits
(hereinafter "permits") to detective Wright for $100.00 (T. 54-57
and State's Exhibit 1, Appendix B).

On each of these permits the

director's and examiner's names, the results of examination, a
"No Rests" ["No Restriction"] notation and expiration dates had
already been filled in (T. 57-58).

On December 7, 1989, detective Wright again met
defendant to purchase two more permits, this time at 912 East
Second South, defendant's apartment (T. 59). These two permits
were also filled in with the names of the examiner and director,
results of examination, a "No Rests" ["No Restriction"] notation
and an expiration date (T. 59-61 and State's Exhibit 2, Appendix
B).

Defendant sold these two permits to detective Wright for

$100.00 (T. 60).
On cross examination detective Wright testified that
she had not seen defendant fill in any portion of these four
permits and that they were already filled in as described when
sold to her (T. 67-69).

She testified that she did not know if

the signatures were actually those of Department of Public Safety
personnel, nor did she know who the director of the driver's
license service was (T. 69-71).

She also testified that each of

the four permits were not complete as to the name, height,
weight, sex, eye color, hair color and date of birth of the
person to whom it issued and that the permits purchased on
December 7, 1989 were invalid in the condition in which she
received them from defendant (T. 67-69).

However, on redirect

examination, detective Wright testified that defendant instructed
her on how to fill out the permits by putting in any name and
nine-digit driver's license number (T. 72).
On December 12, 1989, detective Wright met with
defendant one last time at the undercover location, 2403 South
2700 West, to purchase a pad of fifteen permits (T. 61-62).
Defendant delivered the blank permits, left and then later
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returned to receive payment from another undercover agent (T.
63),

When defendant returned detective Wright had been joined by

detective Carroll Mays of the Salt Lake City Police Department
(T. 63 and 73-74).
In the course of his discussion about the price for the
blank permits, detective Mays testified that defendant told him
that defendant normally sold this type of permit for $50.00 each,
that "[the permits] worked fine and people had used them for I.D.
and such with no problem" (T. 75-76).

Thereafter, at detective

Mays' request, defendant filled in the director's and examiner's
signatures and the results of examination section on one of the
permits (T. 76-77 and State's Exhibit 3, Addendum B). Detective
Mays also testified that since the "scam" involved his reselling
the permits, defendant told him to put in the name, address,
physical description and other information and to make the
signatures just as defendant had (T. 77). After receiving those
instructions from defendant, detective Mays paid defendant
$400.00 (T. 77).
On cross examination detective Mays also testified that
the permit filled in for him by defendant, without the identity
of the licensees, was not valid (T. 79).
Defendant did not testify.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Common law crimes have been abolished in Utah, and thus
the crime of forgery is determined by the plain meaning of the
forgery statute.

Further, the Criminal Code is to be liberally

construed in order to effect the object of the forgery statute.
The Model Penal Code, upon which the forgery statute is based,
assigns criminal culpability to one who merely makes or transfers
a writing purporting to be that of another with knowledge that he
is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone.

The

commentaries to the Model Penal Code clearly imply that a "nonmaterial" making of a writing with intent either to defraud or to
facilitate the perpetration of a fraud by anyone who will
complete the execution of the scheme is sufficient to make out
the crime of forgery.

The uncontroverted evidence was that

defendant believed himself to be assisting in a scheme to pass
the permits to persons who would then fill in the remaining blank
spaces and sell them to others for illegitimate purposes.
Even if a common law requirement pertained in Utah,
that a writing must purport to have "legal efficacy" before it
can constitute a forgery, an exception to the common law,
allowing conviction for forgery even where other steps are needed
to be taken in order to perfect the writing, should apply.

This

exception is implicitly bolstered by the Commentary to the Model
Penal Code which advises that forgery is committed when the actor
makes the writing and gives it to another to execute the
fraudulent scheme.

Given the more expansive reach of the Model

Penal Code in assigning culpability, there was sufficient
evidence to support defendant's conviction.
POINT II
Defendant was not entitled to lesser included offense
instructions on any of his three alternative theories: (1)

attempted forgery, (2) prohibited use of a license or (3)
receiving stolen property.

A jury might reasonably have inferred

from the evidence that defendant was guilty of attempted forgery
and prohibited use of a license. However, the evidence did not
provide a rational basis for convicting defendant of receiving
stolen property because there was no evidence of any kind
indicating the origin of the permits or how defendant obtained
them.

In any event, given that the permits "made" and/or

"transferred" were actionable writings under the statute, there
was no evidence providing a rational basis for acquitting
defendant of forgery.
POINT III
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
dismiss.

The forgery and prohibited use of a license statute

apply to different criminal conduct. Also, because defendant
"transferred" a writing, conduct not provided for under the
prohibited use of a license statute, the forgery statute was more
specific to defendant's criminal conduct.

Thus, defendant was

properly charged with forgery.
POINT IV
The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant is guilty of attempted forgery.

Therefore, should this

Court determine that there is insufficient evidence to convict
defendant of forgery because the permits were not complete, this
Court may vacate and set aside the forgery conviction and remand
the case for the entry of judgment of conviction for attempted
forgery.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH FORGERY STATUTE, BROADLY AND
REASONABLY CONSTRUED, EMBRACES DEFENDANT'S
TRANSFER OF PARTIALLY COMPLETED PERMITS,
BASED ON THE INTENT AND POLICY OF THE MODEL
PENAL CODE ON WHICH THE STATUTE IS BASED,
Defendant claims that the Utah forgery statute contains
a common law requirement that a "writing" purport to have "legal
efficacy", in order for it to be a forgery.

Thus, defendant

argues, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of forgery
because the permits he sold to police undercover agents were void
for lack of certain licensee identifying information.

Under the

Utah Criminal Code this claim is untenable.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1990) provides:
Common law crimes are abolished and no
conduct is a crime unless made so by this
code, other applicable statute or ordinance.
See also State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 904 (Utah 1982) (common
law inapplicable as determinant of intent necessary to prove
attempted first degree murder).

See also State v. Coando, 784 P.2d 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a
bad check case in which this Court held that an alleged common
law requirement that the essential elements of the crime were
restricted to the mens rea and actus reus of the perpetrator was
inoperable where the relevant statute also explicitly
incorporated the drawee's refusal to make payment an express
element of the crime. In so holding, this Court noted (1) the
common law had been abolished by statute; (2) some jurisdictions
had incorporated the common law as argued by the defendant, but
that Utah had not; (3) defendant had given no support for his
contention that the statute was a mere codification of the common
law; and (4) that in determining the essential elements of the
charged offense, the Court was compelled to follow the
unambiguous language of the statute, rather than the requisites
of the common law. Id. at 1231.
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In this case, defendant simply asserts the common law
requirement that a document be legally effective in order to
constitute a forgery.

He provides no authority or argument

indicating that section 76-6-501 codifies the common law as to
"legal efficacy."

The State has been unable to locate any cases

under section 76-6-501, or its predecessors, that have even
2
referred to "legal efficacy" as an element of forgery.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 (1990), under which defendant
was charged, provides, in pertinent part:

Even if there remained in the Utah forgery statute a vestige of
the common law of forgery requiring that forged writings purport
to have apparent legal efficacy, such rule would not exculpate
defendant in this case. "An instrument may be the subject of
forgery even though the taking of other steps was required before
the instrument could be perfected, and such steps were not
taken." 4 C.E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 510 (14th ed.
1981); see also id. at § 512 at 147. Examples of this exception
to the general common law rule are found in Clay v. State, 57
Ala. App. 630, 632-33, 330 So. 2d 453, 455 (Ala. Crim. App. 1975)
(savings withdrawal slip lacking savings account number still
possessed apparent legal efficacy in forgery conviction); Hall v.
State, 31 Ala. App. 455, 18 So. 2d 572, 573-74 (Ala. Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 245 Ala. 455, 18 So. 2d (Ala. 1944) (forged
appearance bond possessed apparent legal efficacy even though the
further step of applying a signature would have to be taken in
order to perfect it).
Defendant cites State v. Ortega, 418 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa
1988), in support of his claim. The defendant in that case was
prosecuted under a statute which made criminal the making or
altering of any public document or any instrument which purports
to be a public document. The case clearly stands for the
proposition that a public document must purport to have legal
efficacy in order to constitute a forgery. However, the
documents at issue were completely blank driver's license forms,
obviously lacking even the semblance of apparent legal efficacy,
and so ineligible for the application of the exception to the
common law, discussed above. Moreover, the Iowa penal code is
not based on the Model Penal Code as is the criminal code of
Utah. Thus, neither the abolition of the common law crimes nor
the policy interests expressed by the drafters of the Model Penal
Code were at issue in the case.

(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge
that he is facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another
without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so that
the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance,
transference, publication or utterance
purports to be the act of another, whether
the person is existent or nonexistent, or
purports to have been executed at a time
or place or in a numbered sequence other
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy
of an original when no such original
existed,
(2) As used in this section "writing"
includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens,
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of
value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second
degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or any
other instrument or writing issued~by a
government, or any agency thereof.
In contradistinction to forgery statutes of other
jurisdictions, section 76-6-501 does not require that the forged
4
writing purport to have "legal efficacy."
Nor does the statute
require that the writing even be complete on its face in order to
constitute forgery.

The jury was instructed as to all five counts of forgery under
the relevant, operative terms of subsections (l)(b), (2) and
(3)(a) (R. 101-111).
See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-10 (Repl. Pamp 1984); La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 14.72 (West 1986).
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The source of section 76-6-501 is N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 638.1.

Both the Utah and New Hampshire forgery statutes are

plainly modelled after the Model Penal Code's forgery section.
The Model Penal Code strongly suggests that the making
of an incomplete document, in appropriate circumstances,
constitutes forgery.

In discussing the conduct embraced by the

crime of forgery, the drafters of the Model Penal Code
deliberately omitted a "materiality" element, commenting:
Section 224.1 does not contain a
"materiality" element. The requirement of a
purpose to defraud or injure or,
alternatively, of knowledge of facilitating
fraud by another is an adequate measure of
the propriety of applying criminal sanctions.
The addition of a "materiality" element would
entail litigation of the sort that has
occurred with the perjury offense without the
compensating advantage of focusing upon an
essential ingredient of liability. One who
perpetrates or intends to perpetrate a fraud
or other injury by making a non-material
alteration should be judged, as in other
forgery cases, by the scope of the harm and
the nature of the altered instrument.
Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 224.1 comment at 298
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (emphasis added).
The commentaries to the Model Penal Code also strongly
suggest that by adding the alternative mens rea, i.e. that the
defendant acts "with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud or
injury to be perpetrated by anyone," the drafters intended to
reach defendants who had not themselves completed the crime by

L.D. Martin, Utah Criminal Code Outline, Pt. 5 at 190 (1st ed.
1973).
Model Penal Code § 224.1 (Official Draft and Explanatory Notes
1985) (see Appendix A ) .
**

passing the forged writing:
This alternative mens rea was added after the
tentative draft in order to make it clear
that a forger commits an offense even though
he does not defraud the person to whom he
sells or passes the forged writings as where
the transferee takes with knowledge of the
forgery for the purpose of passing the
writings as authentic. Thus, forgery will be
committed in the common situation where the
actor makes or alters the writing and gives
it to another to execute the fraudulent
scheme.
Id. at 299-300 (citation omitted).
Utah's penal statutes should be broadly construed
"according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice
and to effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of
Section 76-1-104."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990).

In State

v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), the court broadly
construed the criminal simulation statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-8518 (1990), to include baseball mitts within its terms in the
face of the defendant's claim that the statute failed to specify
the type of goods in question and that similar criminal
simulation statutes had been interpreted narrowly as covering
only unique chattels, such as antiques or paintings.

Quoting

from a similar case in New York, the court rejected the
defendant's argument, adopting the Model Penal Code's view that
its fraudulent simulation section embraced objects other than
unique chattels.

Id. at 192.

In State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1989), the
court considered whether the receiving stolen property statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990), embraced property that was not
actually stolen.

Relying on the Model Penal Code (as well as
1 O

other authorities), the court determined that property received
by an accused need not be stolen in order to criminalize
otherwise culpable conduct, ^d. at 1170-1173.

The manner in

which the court developed the rationale for its decision, whereby
conceivably non-culpable conduct was found to be within the
statute's purview, is instructive in this case:
Modern criminal jurisprudence has a very
clear bias toward punishing an actor's intent
instead of simply punishing the manifest
criminality or outwardly criminal act. Our
Legislature has expressed that its concern is
directed more toward subjective criminality
than toward manifest criminality by stating
in [Utah Code Ann.] § 76-1-104(2) [(1953, as
amended)]:
The Provisions of this code shall be
construed in accordance with these general
purposes.
. . . .

(2) Define adequately the conduct and
mental state which constitute each offense

and safeguard conduct that is without
fault from condemnation as
criminal.
. . . .

(Emphasis added.) Section 76-2-101 expresses
the same legislative purpose:
No person is guilty of an offense unless
his conduct is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence
with respect to each element of the
offense as the definition of the offense
requires;
. . .

See State v. Elton, Utah, 680 P.2d 727
(1984). Sections 76-1-104 and 76-2-101
demonstrate a legislative desire not to
punish manifestly criminal acts that are not
accompanied by a subjective mental state to
do wrong. The converse is also true. We see
the Legislature's desire to punish subjective
criminality so long as it is linked with some
otherwise harmless corroborative act that
demonstrates the firmness of the actor's
criminal resolve. Examples of this are [Utah
Code Ann.] § 76-4-101(3)(b) [(1953, as
amended)], which denies an impossibility
defense to an attempt charge, and [Utah Code
_1 0__

Ann.] § 76-2-304(1) [(1953, as amended)],
which states that a mistake of fact is a
defense only if it disproves the culpable
mental state.
Likewise, in the theft by
receiving statute the Legislature expressed
its desire to prohibit subjective criminality
(the culpable mental state of desiring to
receive stolen property) when it is
accompanied by an otherwise harmless act
(receiving property that is not actually
stolen). The interpretation that the subject
property need not be stolen and that the
focus is on the actor's mental state is in
harmony with the modern trend of criminal
jurisprudence. See generally
G. Fletcher,
Rethinking
Criminal Law ch. 3 (1978).
Id. at 1172 (emphasis added).
In this case, defendant's mental state clearly
evidenced criminal intent.

The completion of the permits was

merely the last remaining act in a fraud to be perpetuated by
others, all of which was contemplated by defendant in the act of
selling the permits.

On the critical issue, that the permits

were incomplete and thus void, officer Wright testified that
defendant instructed her on how to fill out the permits by
putting in any name and nine-digit driver's license number she
chose (T. 72). Officer Mays testified even more particularly to
defendant's facilitating the perpetration of a fraud by having
another complete the writings:
A [Officer Mays] What this is a Utah State
Department of Public Safety temporary
driver's license. Says driver's license,
temporary counter permit.
Q [State's Attorney]
document before?
A

Yes.

Q

And when was that?

Have you seen that

I have.

_1 A ^

A When I purchased it from Mr. Singh and he
filled it out.
Q What was the circumstances of him filling
it out?
A He had shown me a driver's license pretty
similar to that that he carried in the
sleeve, cigarette pocket of his nylon flight
jacket. He had pulled it out and showed it
to me, showed me how it was filled out. And
he said it works just fine. He drove a truck
and he'd been stopped and no problems. I
said, well, you know, [I am] not going to buy
these. I don't really know how to fill these
out. Never having dealt with them, and he
filled in the director's signature down at
the bottom and the examiner's signature in
two places on the right-hand side of the
document.
Q

Where did he physically fill that one out?

A Uh—I was sitting in my office at the desk
and he basically perched on the edge of the
desk, and leaded over with his pen and filled
them out, right in front of me.
Q Did you observe him actually fill that
out?
A

Yes, sir.

I did.

Q And what other identifying marks are there
on that, is there any examiner's score?
A He has filled in part of the result of the
examination section, and additionally, he
instructed me how to fill out the remainder
of it.
Q

What was his instruction?

A Since the scam, if you will, that I was
going to resell them, he told me to put in
the name, and address and physical
description, et cetera, on the left side, and
make the signatures like he had made them.
Q After you received that from him, did you
at that time make payment?
A

Yes.

I did.

I gave him $400 in cash.

Q

And what did Mr. Singh do then?

A

Pocketed the money and he left.

(T. at 76-77) (emphasis added).
By instructing officers Wright and Mays on how to
complete the permits, with knowledge that the completed permits
were then to be resold, defendant fully directed a fraudulent
scheme involving the transfer of completed writings.

Employing

the view adopted in Pappasf that the core of criminal conduct
lies in the intent to do harm, and particularly in view of the
Model Penal Code's strong suggestions that a non-material, i.e.
less than complete, making of a writing constitutes forgery in an
appropriate case, this Court should determine that defendant's
partial making of a writing expressly intended to be completed by
others, all with the intent to defraud, is conduct embraced by
section 76-6-501.
Defendant also argues that in selling only incomplete
permits his crime may be nothing more than an attempted forgery.
In Pappas, the court considered the possibility that the
receiving stolen property statute did not literally require that
the subject property be stolen, suggesting that the defendant
might be guilty of nothing more than an attempt.

In

distinguishing the attempt statute the court noted that the
"[receiving stolen property statute required] the union of the
culpable mental state and all

the steps within the actor's power

to complete the intended theft."

Id. at 1173 (emphasis added).

In so reasoning the court noted that while the change in the
statute offended common law thinking, the legislature had

abolished common law crimes and was free to proscribe the
defendant's class of activity, that of being a known fence.
Ibid.
The policy behind the forgery statute is to fulfill the
public's need to have "a guarantee of authenticity of instruments
and records upon which the community can rely in important
7
transactions."

In this case# defendant took all the steps that

were within his power to effect a fraudulent scheme.

Only the

entry of certain information, which could only have been made by
persons other than defendant if the scheme were to be completely
effected, remained.

Defendant was fully aware of and intended

this final step, as the uncontroverted testimony of detectives
Wright and Mays demonstrated.

The policy and intent of section
o

76-6-501 clearly embrace such conduct.

The evidence was thus

Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 224.1 comment at 283
(Official Drafts and Revised Comments 1980); see also Model Penal
Code § 224.1 explanatory note at 154 ("A separate forgery offense
is needed in order to recognize the special effectiveness of
forgery as a means of undermining public confidence in important
symbols of commerce and as a means of perpetrating widespread
fraud").
g
Defendant, while arguing his motion to dismiss just prior to
trial, acknowledged a sufficient culpable intent to defraud under
section 76-6-501. In arguing that the "writing" must purport to
have "legal efficacy," defendant stated:
MR. LOYD [Defense counsel]: I don't see how
a writing can be used even in the sense of
facilitating a fraud if it still has on its
face been legally efficacious. It may be
that Mr, Singh was facilitating a fraud but
not directly and not even indirectly. He was
going to be the person who holds it out to
someone to use to be facilitating a fraud.
(T. 14) (emphasis added).
i •»_

fully sufficient to convict defendant of forgery.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS ON ANY OF HIS
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR
ACQUITTING DEFENDANT OF FORGERY.
Due process entitles a defendant to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the case.

Beck v. Alabama/ 447 U.S.

625, 637 (1980); State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah 1984).
But, this right is not absolute; it is limited by the evidence
presented at trial.
1983).

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah

Thus, where as here, a defendant requests an instruction

on a lesser included offense, the trial court is obligated to
give the requested instruction only where there is:
a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense."
Id. at 159.

It is not sufficient that the evidence simply

The remaining elements necessary to defendant's forgery
conviction, namely defendant's transfer of writings purportedly
those of the government, were satisfied by uncontroverted
evidence. Defendant sold five permits to police undercover agents
on three separate occasions (T. 54-60 and 79). All of the
permits bore the names of persons other than defendant,
purportedly those of Department of Public Safety examiners and
directors (State's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3; Appendix B). Defendant
has admitted that he was not authorized to act on behalf of the
State (Appellant's Brief at 16).
In Baker, the court ruled that the defendant, upon his
request, is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction if,
based on the evidence at trial, (1) the offense charged and the
lesser included offense are related so that some of their
statutory elements overlap, and where evidence of the greater
offense included proof of some or all of those overlapping
elements; and (2) there is a rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense, Ijd. at 159.
In this case, defendant requested lesser included

i o_

provides a basis to convict of the lesser offense, it must
"simultaneously" provide a rational basis for the jury to acquit
of the greater-

State v. Crick# 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983)

(defendant not entitled to lesser included offense instruction
where acquittal of second degree murder necessarily required
acquittal of manslaughter);

State v. Pitts, 726 P.2d 113, 116

(Utah 1986) (per curiam) (evidence not so ambiguous as to be
susceptible to interpretation that defendant was not guilty of
burglary but guilty of theft); State v. Speerf 750 P.2d 186, 19091 (Utah, 1988) (lesser included offense instructions on assault
and burglary properly denied where supporting evidence did not
negate elements of aggravated assault and aggravated burglary).
In this case there was no evidence providing a rational
basis for acquitting defendant of forgery.

The State's theory at

trial was that defendant, with intent to defraud or to facilitate
a fraud to be perpetrated by another, transferred writings
purporting to be issued by the government (T. 93-96).
did not take the stand or call any witnesses.

Defendant

Other than

eliciting from the State's witnesses that the permits were void
as sold to police detectives, defendant offered no evidence at
all to refute the State's case.

If, therefore, this Court should

Cont. offense instructions on attempted forgery, prohibited
use of a license and receiving stolen property. The State
concedes that with respect to attempted forgery the first prong
of Baker is satisfied. The State does not concede that with
respect to receiving stolen property and prohibited use of a
license, the first prong of Baker is satisfied. However, the
State has not further briefed its contention on this latter point
because defendant's proffered instructions, on all of his three
theories, fail to satisfy the second prong of Baker, as discussed
below.

find that the partially completed permits transferred by
defendant are actionable writings under section 76-6-501, as
argued above, then this Court must also find that defendant was
not entitled to lesser included offense instructions on any of
his alternate theories.
Defendant also suggests that even if his requested
instructions do not qualify as lesser included offense
instructions, he is nonetheless entitled to have them considered
by the jury.

The suggestion misconstrues the law.

To the extent

that defendant argues that his lesser included offense
instructions are alternative theories, his argument is
nonetheless insupportable under the Baker standard.

It is an

elevation of form over substance for defendant to suggest that he
may escape a Baker analysis merely by denoting alternative
substantive crimes as other than lesser included offenses.

Each

of the three cases defendant cites in support of his argument
concern instructions going only to limited aspects of that
defendant's particular defense, rather than the separate and
entire criminal offenses offered by defendant.

In support, defendant cites Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455,
458-59 (Utah 1981) (trial court's refusal of jury instructions
relating specifically to negligent character of defendant's
conduct harmless error at most); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694,
695 (Utah 1980) (defendant entitled to jury instruction on issue
of self-defense); and State y. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550-51 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) (refusal to give instruction on specific witness's
credibility not an abuse of discretion in light of general
instruction on jury's duty to evaluate credibility).

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CHARGED FOR FORGERY
WHICH PROSCRIBED DIFFERENT CONDUCT THAN
PROHIBITED USE OF A LICENSE STATUTE AND WHICH
WAS MORE SPECIFIC TO DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL
CONDUCT.
To the extent that defendant's argument, that the trial
court improperly refused to submit his alternative theories to
the jury, is actually in response to the trial court's denial of
his motion to dismiss, it is mistaken.
At trial defendant moved to dismiss the forgery charge
not simply on the ground that the writings were incomplete, but
on the theory that defendant should have been charged under the
prohibited use of a license statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-133
1990) (T. 14-18, 81-85).

The essence of his motion was that

section 41-2-133 is (1) more specific to the facts of this case
and (2) prohibits the same conduct, thereby entitling defendant
to face the possibility of the lesser punishment provided by that
section (T. 14-17, 81-83).

In support defendant cites State v.

Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 345-46, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (1969) (doubt
as to whether defendant should be punished under either Drug
Abuse Control Law or Narcotic Drug Act, both providing for drug
possession, entitled defendant to benefit of lesser penalty under
former statute); and Helmuth v. Morris, 598 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah
1979) (defendant not entitled to lesser penalty under forgery
statute where passing of forged prescriptions more specifically
provided for by Utah Controlled Substances Act).
Defendant's reliance on Shondel and Helmuth is
misplaced.

In this case the trial court rejected both of

defendant's approaches noting that defendant's "transfer" of
writings, the focal point of the State's case, went beyond a
common law interpretation of the forgery statute and was not even
an element of section 41-2-133 (T. 84-85).

Thus, the court

properly recognized that the two statutes did not prohibit the
same conduct and that defendant's conduct was actually more
specially prohibited by the forgery statute than the prohibited
use of a license statute (T. 85).12 On such ground, the trial
court correctly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
POINT IV
JUDGMENT FOR ATTEMPTED FORGERY MAY BE ENTERED
IF EVIDENCE OF FORGERY IS FOUND INSUFFICIENT.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (1990) provides that if an
appellate court determines the evidence insufficient to convict
the defendant of the charged offense, it may enter judgment of
conviction for the included offense if there is sufficient
evidence supported by every fact required for conviction, if the
defendant seeks such relief.

The requirement of the defendant's

See also Crick, 675 P.2d at 532 n.4, where in emphasizing that
under the Baker standard evidence must provide not merely a
rational basis to prove the lesser included offense but also a
rational basis to acquit of the charged offense, the court
stated:
This conclusion is not contrary to State
v. Shondelf 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146
(1969), and its progeny, which hold that
where two statutes proscribe the same conduct
but impose different penalties, the defendant
is entitled to the lesser penalty. Recent
cases stress that Shondel does not apply
where the statutes do not prohibit the same
conduct. Helmuth v. Morris, Utah 598 P.2d
333 (1979), or where there is no doubt as to
which of the two statutes is applicable to
the facts of a particular case. State v.
Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161 (1980).

seeking judgment of conviction on the included offense has been
satisfied where the defendant has admitted the requisite conduct.
See State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985) (murder
conviction set aside and judgment of conviction for manslaughter
ordered where the defendant impliedly consented to reduction of
charge by offering lesser included instruction for manslaughter
and admitted requisite state of mind); State v. Devlin, 699 P.2d
717, 718 (Utah 1985) (conviction of distribution of cocaine
vacated and conviction of attempt entered where the defendant
admitted all the elements of an attempted sale of cocaine but
sale was not completed).
In this case, defendant has sought a lesser included
instruction on attempted forgery.

Every fact necessary to prove

that crime was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant has
admitted the criminal conduct.13 Therefore, should this Court
determine that there is insufficient evidence to convict
defendant of forgery because the permits were not complete, this
Court may vacate and set aside the forgery conviction and remand
the case for the entry of judgment of conviction for attempted
forgery.

Facts the jury necessarily found to prove defendant's
attempted forgery are discussed above at 17 n.8 and 9.
Additionally, defendant admitted that he sold the five partially
complete permits to police undercover agents (defendant's
"Memorandum In Support of Motion to Quash the Bindover" at R. 23;
Appendix C ) .
-23-

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court affirm defendant's conviction.
7^

DATED this

day of March, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

76-1-106. Strict construction rule not applicable.
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to
this code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state.
All provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall
be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and
to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.

41-2-133. Violation of license provisions.
It is a class B misdemeanor for a person to:
(1) display or cause or permit to be displayed or to have in possession
any license knowing it is fictitious or has been cancelled, revoked, suspended, or altered;
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a license issued to him, by a
person not entitled to it;
(3) display or to represent as his own a license not issued to him;
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the division upon demand any license
which has been suspended, canceled, or revoked;
(5) use a false name or give a false address in any application for a
license or any renewal or duplicate of the license, or to knowingly make a
false statement, or to knowingly conceal a material fact or otherwise
commit a fraud in the application; or
(6) permit any other prohibited use of a license issued to him.

MODEL PENAL CODE

ARTICLE 224. FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT
PRACTICES

Section 224.1. Forgery.
(1) Definition. A person is guilty of forgery If, with purpose to
defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating
a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the acton
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or
transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another
who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a
time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact
the case, or to be a eopy of an original when no such original
existed; or
(c) utters any writing which he knows to be forged in a man*
ner specified in paragraphs (a) or (b).
"Writing" includes printing or any other method of recording
information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards,
badges, trade-marks, and other symbols of value, right, privilege,
or identification.
(2) Grading. Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the
writing is or purports to be part of an issue of money, securities,
postage or revenue stamps, or other instruments issued by the gov*
eminent, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments
representing interests in or claims against any property or enterprise. Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or
purports to be a will, deed, contract, release, commercial instrument, or other document evidencing, creating, transferring, alter*
ing, terminating, or otherwise affecting legal relations. Otherwise forgery is a misdemeanor.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO QUASH
THE BINDOVER

:

v.
•

CHANNAN S. SINGH,

:

Defendant.

Case No. 901900431FS
Judge RICHARD H. MOFFAT

:
FACTS

Evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing indicated
Mr. Singh possessed blank Driver License Temporary Counter
Permits obtained from the Utah State Department of Public
Safety.

The Counter Permits, when properly filled out, may be

used as either a temporary driving permit or an instruction
(learner) permit.

In the course of an undercover operation

Singh sold five partially complete Counter Permits to Salt Lake
Metro Narcotics Officers Mays and Wright.

In each case Singh

sold Counter Permits which were completed in part, but blank as
to the name, address, date issued, birthdate, height, sex,
weight, eye color, and signature of the licensee.

